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BOOK REVIEWS
JACQUES ELLUL: THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW, translated from

the French by Marguerite Wieser, New York: Doubleday, 1960. Pp. 140. $3.95.
First published in France in 1946, this vigorous statement of a Christian philosophy
of law has now been made available in English. A convert to Christianity and a
professor of law at the University of Bordeaux, Jacques Ellul has a growing reputation in Christian circles as one attempting to relate Christian categories to the
discipline of law; his The Presence of the Kingdom caused some stir when it was
published here in 1951.
This volume, written in terse and sharp strokes, is an attempt to establish a
Biblical foundation for law, countered both to the prevailing positivism of secularism,
as might be represented by Kelsen, but also to the natural law tradition. Divine law,
for Ellul, is not to be set alongside of natural law or above it, as setting "counsels
of perfection," but to supplant it. His case against the natural law is not the usual
one, rested on its ambiguity, or that of cultural relativism, but is the Biblical argument, that, since man's "nature" is totally perverted in the Fall (and if this were
not so, why the necessity of the Incarnation?), to base a normative theory of law
on such corruption is impossible.
Rather, the divine law of revelation, which is the opposition, not the completion,
of natural law, is the only authentic starting point. Ellul is at pains to show how
natural law and divine law are opposed in spirit at every turn. Biblical "righteousness" or "justice," incarnate in Christ, is the only source and touchstone of law.
The right meaning of- law can be derived only from the covenant, the parousia,
and the final eschaton. He is radically Christocentric.
Even from a quick glance, it is plain that Ellul is spokesman for a radical
evangelical Protestant position. His case will be convincing to those who would
start within the same circle of faith, and accept his dogmatic categories. There is
sharp thinking in this book, and some telling attack on the ambiguities of the
natural law tradition (despite his anti-rationalism, he is not above using a lawyer's
logic). But his own counter-position raises some fundamental questions of method
which cry out for an answer.
What about the use of Biblical categories, taken over so straight into the contemporary debate about the philosophy of law? He assumes finality of the Incarnation, the resurrection, the ascension, the parousia, and the final eschaton as literal,
apparently, as indispensable to his position. He bypasses, without mention, the
whole question of mythology and "demythologizing" - an issue which any theologian, speaking to a 20th century intellectual community, cannot avoid. How would
Ellul's position differ from that of a Fundamentalist? If it does not, then he is
involved in ambiguities every bit as serious as those that cling to positivism or to
the rationalism of the natural law school.
There is a worrisome issue, too, that clings to his radical Christocentrism.
"Jesus Christ has become the righteousness of God. There can be no justice whatsoever, even relative, outside Jesus Christ."' What does this imply for a philosophy
of law for the devout Jew, or for Eastern cultures? Unless he has recourse to a
logos Christology alien to his evangelical spirit, it would seem necessary for -Ellul
to exclude such not only from salvation but from a modicum of common justice.
Finally, in his anxiety to state vigorously the theological basis of law in revelation, Ellul seems to this reviewer to become preoccupied with the vertical dimension
to the neglect of "the second part," the neighbor. The consideration of the living
"other," the neighbor, with his complexity of needs and rights, "with limbs that
will tear on a rose-bush," is certainly an indispensable part of what constitutes the
law. Yet, at least in this book, "the neighbor" is abstracted, almost into a "case"
to make a theological argument. Perhaps the living person of the neighbor, whose
1 Text at 42.
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claims and counter-claims make up so much of the texture of law, will receive
attention in another promised volume, hinted at in closing, on "the content of the
divine law."
For now, we can express thanks to Professor Ellul for posing sharp questions,
and providing exciting material for the renewed dialogue between Protestant and
Catholic philosophies of law. We can be sure that the conversation will not be
concluded in agreement on his terms.
Waldo Beach*
BY THE PEOPLE. 40th Annual Report of the American Civil Liberties Union.
New York, 1960. Pp. 81. $0.75. The number, variety and complexity of civil
liberties problems which arise each year may, without more, justify the existence
of the American Civil Liberties Union, which has been called "the only organization . . . exclusively and continuously dedicated to the protection and preservation of our basic freedoms . . . performing an enormously useful if not abso-

lutely necessary function."' Some of the worth of the ACLU as a professional
defender of civil liberties may be read in By the People, the Union's fortieth annual
report. The pamphlet not only recounts ACLU activities in 1960 but also catalogues
a large number of the actions of governmental and private bodies which affected
civil liberties and analyzes legal actions in which the Union took no direct part.
As always, much of the activity involved freedom of belief, expression and
association. The Union testified against two proposed constitutional amendments,
both designed to enlarge governmental power to censor "obscene" books. 2 One
would have allowed the states to decide questions of "decency and morality." The
other would have suspended free speech and free press guarantees from application
to books which were found obscene according to the Roth3 definition. The Union's
position is that a causal relationship has not been established between reading
obscene matter and the commission of crime. Thus, Union officials attacked the
former provision on the ground that the words "decency" and "morality" defy
precise definition and, by reason of their vagueness, invade constitutional protections. Since the ACLU does not agree with the standards laid down in Roth,
it feels that the way ought to be left open for the Supreme Court to change its
opinion on the basis of new evidence.
Union affiliates and private pressure groups clashed often during the year.
The most active and, concededly, most effective of these pressure groups are the
local Citizens for Decent Literature organizations. In Northern California, the
Union affiliate, while not denying the right of a private group to express its views,
opposed the practice of such groups' pressuring newsdealers and distributors by
threatening boycotts. The affiliate contended that such acts endaAger the constitutional rights of citizens. 4
The Union objects to the preparation of lists of objectionable material by
CDL groups for use by police in clean-up campaigns. This and other techniques
resulted in clashes last year between Union and CDL affiliates in Evanston, Ill.,
Youngstown, Ohio, 5 and San Mateo and San Francisco, California.6 The recurrence
of such incidents is to be expected. Neither the ACLU nor the CDL approves of
the trend of recent obscenity decisions. The CDL thinks that the definition should
be broadened; the ACLU argues that it should be restricted.
* B.D., Ph.D., Professor of Christian Ethics and Director of Graduate Studies in Religion,
Divinity School, Duke University.
1 O'Meara, Introduction to FRAENKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
v (1960).
2 Text at 9.
3 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
4 Text at 11.
5 Ibid.
6 Text at 13.
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With respect to film censorship, the report notes with approval that the
Legion of Decency is continuing its program of clarifying its principles and practices.
Still, the Union disapproves of some of the uses to which the list is put. The mayor
of one Massachusetts town,7 according to the ACLU report, serves as the community's film censor, condemning films, without having seen them, solely on the
basis of Legion ratings. In another town8 in the same state, no films condemned
by the Legion are shown pursuant to an agreement between the mayor and the
local exhibitors. The Union also disapproves of the use of economic boycotts of
houses which show objectionable films. Private groups ought to be free to inform
and persuade their members with respect to viewing films, but shoild not, by preventing the exhibition of certain films, force their standards upon the entire community.
How much does a citizen have a right to know about the activities of public
bodies? The Illinois affiliate of the ACLU applauded the decision of the Chicago
City Council to allow radio and television coverage of its meetings. 9 The Union
supported an amendment to the Administrative Procedures Act which would have
made clear the fact that the public information section of the act does not provide statutory authority for withholding government information. 0
But the Union also opposed a Senate bill which would have allowed the public
access to all papers filed in federal courts. Since the material is eventually made
public when some phase of the action is heard in court, the public's access to the
information is guaranteed. In addition, a person ought not be exposed to "public
obloquy or scorn without a fair opportunity to meet the bare allegations.""
Similarly, the Union opposed the releasing of the FBI report on the Mack
Charles Parker case after two grand juries refused to return indictments. "To do
so . . would be directly contrary to the constitutional principle that accusations
against people are to be handled through the judicial process..12 The New
York Civil Liberties Union sponsored a bill in the state legislature to prevent
grand juries from making public presentments attacking persons or policies without charging the commission of a crime.' 3 The ACLU also opposes' 4 the photographing or televising of trials on the ground that the public trial is for the
benefit of the accused. If a witness is made more nervous or anxious because of
the presence of cameras and microphones, the purpose of the trial is partially
frustrated, without a corresponding advantage in increased public knowledge.15
The line as to where the public's right to information ends is admittedly
not easy to draw. The ACLU tends to advocate greatly increased dissemination
of information about the activities of public bodies except where a given individual
will almost surely be hurt by the disclosure.
Correspondingly difficult is the problem of determining whether labor union
dues ought to be used for political purposes. The Union's position is that such
use is protected by the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech. 16 A distinction is made between special assessments for political activities and the use
of regular dues for such purposes. In the former case, the Union believes that
dissenting members ought not to be required to contribute. But where minority
7 Id. at 17.
8

Id. at 19.

9 Id. at 22.
10 Id. at 21.
11 Ibid.
12 Text at 50.
13 Id. at 68.
14 Id. at 70.
15 See Cedarquist, Televising Court Proceedings, a Plea for Order in the Court, 36
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 147 (1961).
16 Text at 42.
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members have had a full opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, their civil liberties are not denied where the decision is to use union dues
for political activities.
The Union does not deny that labor union meetings are often a far cry
from open forums, but it suggests that the remedy lies not in the stifling of group
opinion but in making union meetings more democratic. It is submitted, however,
that the question is not whether group opinion would be stifled but whether a
person who has joined a labor organization, whose objectives are essentially
apolitical, should be forced to pay for the expression of partisan political opinions
with which he does not agree. 7
Not surprisingly, much ACLU activity was devoted to preserving or erecting
an absolute wall of separation between church and state. The Civil Liberties Union
of Massachusetts opposed a bill in the state legislature providing for state payment of tuition to parents whose children attend non-public schools;' 8 the Florida
Civil Liberties Union is supporting litigation designed to end religious practices
in the state's public schools.' 9 The New York Civil Liberties Union is backing an
appeal of a ruling by the State Education Commissioner that a school board can
pay for transportation of pupils to non-public schools regardless of the distance
travelled.2 0 The affiliate's claim is that providing transportation for pupils to
go 35 miles to school, as some have chosen to do, violates the constitutional requirement of separation of church and state.
The ACLU of Oregon is supporting the suit of three taxpayers who object
to the constitutionality of a state law requiring local school boards to furnish
free textbooks to parochial school children. The judge on the lower court held
that the decision in the Everson2 ' case was binding, although he personally could
not agree with it. If transportation, which he felt directly aided the religion taught
in a parochial school, was to be permitted, then an indirect aid, secular textbooks, must also be permitted. On the other hand, the Greater Philadelphia
Branch of the ACLU approved the use of public funds to provide health services
to non-public schools, since the failure to do so might lead to inferior non-public
22
school health services, thus constituting discrimination on the basis of religion.
This latter position is almost indistinguishable from the position of those who
argue that forcing parents of children in non-public schools to shoulder the double
burden of school taxes and private tuition violates the requirement of equal protection of the laws.23 If lack of adequate health services at a parochial institution
tends to dissuade parents from sending their children there, and thus inhibits religious liberty, does not requiring parents of parochial school children to support
two school systems, in fact, do the same? It is not argued that this is best as
a matter of policy, but if constitutionality alone is considered, could not the Philadelphia affiliate have similarly supported free lunches, textbooks, or bus service?
Could not the same argument be used to justify the state's providing to parochial
schools virtually every service provided to public schools?
Not all of the activities of the Union were directly connected with challenges
to individual civil liberties. Much attention has been drawn to the report of the
ACLU Academic Freedom Committee dealing with the effects of massive private and government grants for research projects. 24 The study questioned whether
17 Interestingly enough, the report includes an acknowledgment of a contribution of
more than $200 from a labor union. Id. at 76.
18 Id. at 29.
19 Id. at 28.
20 Ibid.
21 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22 Text at 29.
23 See Gorman, A Case for Distributive Justice, in
(1959).

24 Text at 23.
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the universities ought to allow themselves to lose such a large measure of their
autonomy by devoting great energy to projects whose objectives are largely determined by outsiders.
Among the problems discussed were the "necessity of obtaining security clearances for faculty members; the neglect of the humanities in favor of the physical
sciences; the burgeoning of so-called programmatic team research at the expense
of the highly individualistic investigator; the magnetic influence over even greater
funds exerted by well-established institutions."'25
Considerations of space permit only this brief suggestion of the variety of
Union activities. Wherever there are people who need to be protected, even from
their democratic governments, the ACLU has devoted every effort to securing
to them their rights. The fact that those aided by the Union are usually not
espousing popular causes only serves to reinforce the argument that the protection
of the rights of minorities most surely preserves the rights of the majority.
In an introduction to the report, the Executive Director of the ACLU,
Patrick Murphy Malin, notes that:
for forty years . . . [the ACLU] . . . has been enthusiastically grateful

for this nation's democratic government and free society; neither the de-

mocracy nor the freedom is complete, but both are wide and deep. The
task of the Union has been, and still is, simply to preserve and improve

both democracy and freedom by defending
the central constitutional safe26
guards which keep power in check."

By legal actions and informational campaigns, the ACLU will continue to
subject to public scrutiny all actions which it regards as challenges to these constitutional safeguards. The merit of such activity scarcely needs elaboration. There
are those who object to specific stands taken by the Union. They can either support the ACLU for the greater part of the work which it does or find other
means of defending civil liberties. In any event the remedy would seem to be
a more vigilant watch rather than none at all.
James J. Harrington

THE SMUT PEDDLERS. By James Jackson Kilpatrick. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960. Pp. vi, 323. $4.50. The "slow rotting of the social
fabric" has been one of the great issues of this past decade and may be the great
issue of the 1960's. The deterioration brought about, or contributed to, by photographs, magazines, books, and motion pictures is a recurring topic2 under the general
heading of obscenity. One should not add mere volume to this mass of literature,
but should write upon the subject only if he has something to contribute in the
way of clarification, analysis, or theory.
Mr. James Jackson Kilpatrick undertook only to record the recorded. Indeed,
instead of clarifying the concept of obscenity he demonstrated that he did not
comprehend what he was recording.
In Part I of his book, Mr. Kilpatrick sought "to convince the most skeptical
of what obscenity means" s by descriptive writing. If his readers read certain passages from books treating the subject of sex, and looked at photographs of children
25

Ibid.

26 Text at 2.
1 Text at 289.

2 Particular attention is called to the following: Note, 35 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 537
(1960); Note, 33 NOTRE DAtE LAWYER 436 (1958); Desmond, Book Review, 32 NOTRE
DAmE LAWYER 547 (1957); Recent Decision, 30 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 469 (1955); Recent
Decision, 29 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 633 (1954).
3 Text at 67.

BOOK REVIEWS
14 and 15 in acts of perverted intercourse, or of women with animals, or of men
engaged in sodomy, Mr. Kilpatrick thought they would be convinced of the fact
of obscenity. This process, unfortunately, does not lead the reader either to the
existence or to the essential content of obscenity. It demonstrates merely that
certain treatments of sex are repugnant to nearly everyone. Nearly all men would
say that these ought not to have been written. But the reason men can agree on
this is that they have applied, no matter how intuitively, a uniform standard of
some sort to the described facts. They have made a judgment. In other words,
hard-core obscenity (what everyone agrees ought not to be written) is not a descriptive fact, as assumed by Mr. Kilpatrick, but a conclusion.
However, seeing hard-core obscenity as a descriptive fact, he goes on to say
the great problem lies in determining what treatments of sex are obscene. In
this he misses the point, for the great issue is determining what is obscenity (nature),
not what is obscene (content). The latter problem exists only to the extent that
the former is not solved.
The analysis of the nature of obscenity is rare in legal writings and nonexistent in The Smut4 Peddlers. It has, however, been necessarily undertaken by
the moral theologian.
Sex is a mystery and, like every mystery, has two elements, one visible, the
other invisible. The visible element is biological: everyone is either male or female;
the invisible, hidden, and mysterious element in sex is its capacity for creativeness,
a sharing in some way of the creative power by which God made the world and all
that is in it.s
Purity is the reverence paid to this mystery of sex.... Those who speak
of sex alone concentrate on the physical or visible element, forgetting the
spiritual or invisible mystery of creativeness.... In the sacred act of creating
life, man and
woman supply the unity of the flesh, God supplies the soul and
the mystery.0
Experience bears out the definition of purity as reverence for mystery.
No one is scandalized at seeing people eat in public, or read in buses, or listen to music on the street, but they are shocked at dirty shows, foul books, or
undue manifestations of affection in public.... It is... because these things
involve aspects of a mystery so deep, so personal, so incommunicable, that we
do not want to see it vulgarized or made common. We like to see the American flag flying over a neighbor's head, but we do not want to see it under his
feet. There is a mystery in that flag, it is more than cloth, it stands for the
unseen, the spiritual, for love and devotion to country. The pure are shocked
at the impure because of the prostitution of the sacred; it'makes the reverent
irreverent. The essence of obscenity is the turning of the inner mystery into
a jest... 7
Purity is a vision, the seeing of the soul in the body, a holy purpose in
the flesh.8

This detailed view of the nature of obscenity is consistent with the short
analysis of it by D. H. Lawrence quoted on the first page.of Mr. Kilpatrick's book:
"The insult to the human body, the insult to a vital human relationship!" It is
possible that Mr. Kilpatrick failed to realize the depth and significance of the statement he quoted.
Although not perceiving the nature of obscenity, he may still have realized
its effect. In Part IV Mr. Kilpatrick says what is involved, or so it seems to him,
is a "slow rotting of the social fabric."' 0 However, this is inconsistent with his statements in Part III, where he appears to agree that no one is grievously harmed by
an unmarried young man finding "vicarious release in the arms of a Playboy play4 E.g., SnHnN,
5
6
7
8
9
10

THREB

Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 124-26.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 129.
Text at 1.
Text at 289.
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mate" or by middle-aged men finding a "bang in filthy pictures or prurient paperbacks."" If he really believes that obscenity involves a "slow rotting of the social
fabric," it would seem that the proper conclusion is not that no one, but that everyone, is harmed.
Obscenity in fact shakes the very foundations of democracy 2 - democracy
understood in this connection in its philosophical sense, as a system of government
which recognizes the inherent worth of man.' 3 The obscene is an attack both on
the existence of a "holy purpose in the flesh," 14 an existence from which the dignity
of man springs, and upon a "vital human relationship," the family.'5 The family
is the training school, the novitiate, for democracy. Nowhere is the dogma of the
worth of man better practiced than in the family.' 6 "Everywhere else man may
be reverenced and respected for what he can do, for his wealth, his power, his
influence, or his charm, but in the family a person is valued because he is. Existence
is worth in the home. ' ?
One wonders whether, had Mr. Kilpatrick understood the nature of obscenity,
he would have wanted to have close cases involving obscenity decided in favor of
free speech, as he advocated in his book, stating that the inclination should be to
side with freedom and not with suppression."8 It seems that siding with censorship
in the doubtful cases is more consistent with freedom, in the long run, than a decision for the more immediate freedom of speech, which is, in the area of obscenity,
the freedom to destroy democracy itself, the fountainhead of freedoms.
Subordinate points that may bother the reader are that in a work of concern
to the whole nation the author states certain constitutional principles and calls them
basic' 9 when they are so regarded only by the South, and then proceeds to conclude that the problem of obscenity is one for the states to handle - federal censorship, in his opinion, being dangerous.2" Federal control is dangerous, it is submitted, only because federal censorship can be effective in dealing with a national
problem, a problem beyond the practical, if not the legal, power of the states.
It is hoped that future works on this subject will reflect the volume of research
that The Smut Peddlers does, but that they will exceed the present work in applying
constructive thought to the discovered materials.
Rocco L. Puntureri

SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAw OF CORPoRATE PRAcTIcE.

Edited by Thomas

G. Roady, Jr., and William R. Andersen. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 423. $10.00. With the ever-increasing importance of the role
of the corporation in our society and the concomitant need for attorneys well
acquainted with the legal implications of this movement, this collection of articles
should be a welcome addition to any attorney's material on the subject. The series

brings up to date the law fronting on many of the major problems in this area and
the impressive list of authors gives added impact to the scholarly treatment of past
events and the forecast of and recommendations for new directions.
I I Text at 224.
12 Id. at 145. Judge Goodman is quoted as saying, "If this be importable literature, then
the dignity of the human person and the stability of the family unit, which are the cornerstones
of society, are lost to us." United States v. Two Obscene Books, 92 F. Supp. 934, (N.D. Cal.
1950).
13 SHEEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 171.
14

Id. at 129.

15
16
17
18

Text at 1.

19

Id. at 87.

op. cit. supra note 4, at 171.
Ibid.
Text at 287-88.
SHEEN,

20 Id. at 290.
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Miguel A. de Capriles' opens the book with a cursory survey of the development of corporate law from 1944 to 1959. He emphasizes recent decisions dealing
with corporation democracy and corporate accountability to stockholders and the
peculiar problems of close corporations. Perhaps the decision most indicative of
a judicial trend in this area is Perlman v. Feldman2, setting a principle of absolute
accountability for profits realized from the sale of corporate control. In spite of
Perlman, the author seems to feel that much more can be done in this area. "A
few judicial decisions have suggested new directions in the path of managerial
accountability, but it cannot be said that substantial progress has really been made
toward a socially responsible capitalism." 3
Paul J. Hartman4 tackles the difficult topic of "State Taxation of Income
From A Multistate Business." After a review of recent decisions 5 and statutory
enactments, 6 Mr. Hartman concludes that much remains to be done in clarifying
the present confusing state of judicial pronouncements. In an analysis of the
Northwestern-Stockham decisions, he reasons that the Supreme Court has devolved
a commerce clause distinction on net income taxes based on form rather than
substance-a conclusion that appears justified from the decisions.
The constitutionality of net income taxes from business that is exclusively interstate, when called into question on commerce clause grounds,
therefore, seems to depend entirely upon statutory formula. A tax levied
directly "on" the net income from a multistate business will be sustained
even if the business is exclusively interstate, if fairly apportioned to business
done within the state so as to avoid multiple tax burdens by other states.
That is the teaching of Northwestern-Stockham case. On the other side of
the shield, a tax measured by net income will fall before the commerce
clause where the statute is less felicitously drawn so that the subject of the
tax is treated
taxwise as the untouchable privilege of engaging in interstate
7
commerce.

What has already been done by the courts and the legislature to clarify the
ambiguous terminology so common in the law of corporate taxation is minutely
discussed and types of judicially acceptable "apportionment of income" by the
various states are reviewed, with an emphasis on the need for uniform legislation.
A similar close study of recent developments concerning corporate gross income
as a measure of state taxation is presented.
The author, borrowing the words of an authority in the field of constitutional
law, appears to agree that "the states can tax interstate commerce if they go about
it in the right way." 8 This searching review should be of value to legislators and
attorneys faced with this perplexing problem.
The applicability of various sections of the Internal Revenue Code to "collapsible corporations" is treated by Boris I. Bittker.9 The complex statutory restrictions
placed on this popular tax-evading arrangement are outlined and alternate provi1 Professor of Law and Associate Dean, New York University School of law.
2 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
3 Text at 19. This is discussed somewhat more optimistically in Rostow, To Whom and
for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible? in MASON (Ed.), THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCeTY (1960); see Book Review, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 105, 105-06 (1960).
4 Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
5 E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959);
Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia,
argued Oct. 14-15, 1958. In each of these two cases, a state imposed on a foreign corporation a net income tax on that portion of the net income of the corporation's interstate business which was reasonably attributable to its business activities within the state. These taxes
were held not to have violated either the commerce clause or the due process clause of the
federal constitution.
6 E.g., 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. I, 1959).
7 Text at 35.
8 Id. at 93; Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State Taxation,
76 U. PA. L. Rzv. 773, 774 (1928).
9 Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
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sions for those willing to walk the tight-rope provided by Congress in Section 341 (e)
are discussed in detail.
An article by Walter W. Brudno,' 0 "Tax Considerations in Selecting a Form
of Foreign Business Organization," takes on added importance in the face of a
growing outward flow of capital from the United States-a good deal of which is
destined for investment in foreign enterprises. A rather comprehensive analysis of
the tax advantages of the forms of corporate structure available for the conduct
of foreign enterprises is presented. He traces preferential treatment afforded by
Congress to certain types of foreign enterprises (e.g., Western Hemisphere trade
corporations, United States possessions corporations, and China Trade Act corporations). The variety of available forms is staggering, but Mr. Brudno appears to
have been able to trim the fat from the meat and has come up with an ordered
outline, and a scholarly treatment, of this increasingly important field.
Mortimer M. Caplin"l has two articles, "Subchapter S and Its Effect on the
Capitalization of Corporations" and "Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed
Legislative Program." This reviewer must admit that a study of Subchapter S
leaves him feeling like the Olympic diver who has just left the diving board and
is now frantically waiting for the pool to fill with water. Mr. Caplin discusses the
tax amendments of September 2, 1958, which enable certain "small business corporations" to elect not to be taxed as corporations. Perhaps it is significant that
the author follows his first article with a second one proposing legislative modification and clarification of Subchapter S. By his ordered attack Mr. Caplin leads
the reader to agree with his conclusion:
Technically, subchapter S contains many structural weaknesses and
complexities. Also, its distinctions are often indefensible and inequitable.
Despite only one year's experience under these provisions, Congress would
be justified in striking it12 from the Code as bad law, not worthy of retention
even in modified form.
After an adequate survey of pre-incorporation tax considerations, the book
takes up the issues presented by the "Initial Capitalization and Financing of Corporations." Chester Rohrlich"3 discusses at length the various types of corporate
financing available and traces their history through both judicial and legislative

pronouncements.

The advantages and disadvantages realized from the different

types of financing are highlighted, and noticeable trends in the law relating to this
topic are discussed. The article is sufficiently footnoted to permit a more detailed
study of any provision; the article itself, while not sacrificing accurateness, retains
the ordered clarity desirable in a work of this sort.
The editors felt it desirable to include a section dealing with "The Corporate
Guaranty" because of the mushrooming importance of this topic in this era of
subsidiary and affiliated corporations. Arthur M. Kreidmann 4 traces the common
law development of the corporate power to guaranty (e.g., performance, loans,
etc.) and then enumerates the various state statutes permitting this type of activity
and placing restrictions on it. The focus of judicial and legislative scrutiny of this
field has been on the "benefit to corporation" theory and apparently the history
of the topic is wound up in an interpretation of what this benefit entails. Mr.
Kreidmann comprehensively treats the New York statute and reviews public policy
considerations. The state statutes abolishing the defense of ultra vires, frequently
used in the past by corporations seeking to evade their suretyship obligations, and
the scanty case authority in the jurisdictions which have such statutes, are noted.

10 Former Editor, World Tax Series, Harvard Law School's international program in
taxation.
11 Professor of Law, University of Virginia, recently appointed Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
12 Text at 210.
13 Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University.
14 Member of the New York Bar.
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Edward R. Hayes 5 takes up the power of state legislatures to change common
law attributes of corporations. This topic brings into consideration three constitutional doctrines: police power, due process and obligation of contracts.
Three principal approaches have been suggested. One is that under its
reserved power the legislature may not make or authorize a majority to
make any changes that will affect the contract between the shareholders
themselves (unless perhaps as to matters where public interest overrides)
but may change or authorize changes only in the contract between the state
and the corporation. A leading spokesman for this view is Justice Stem.
A second approach is that the legislature may make or permit a majority
of the stockholders to make any changes except those which will deprive a
stockholder of some vested right. Among those supporting this view was
Justice Layton. The third approach is that the reserved power of the
legislature is part of the tripartite contract between state, corporation and
shareholders, and therefore the state or a majority of the shareholders when
authorized by the state may make any change as to corporate16 attributes
without impairing any obligation of any aspect of that contract.
Mr. Hayes uses these three approaches in appraising the attributes inherent

in a common law corporation and which of these attributes the legislature has the
power to change. His treatment of the subject is a valuable source of background
information for those corporation attorneys faced with the effect of future legislation on corporate contractual affairs. An aside on the courses of action to be
recommended by corporate counsel is presented in "Corporate Law
Department
17
Communications-Privilege And Discovery," by Thomas R. Hunt.
The history of privilege in this area, the initial reluctance of courts to recognize the dual role played by a corporation counsel, and the resulting circumscribed
bounds to attorney-client privilege in the corporation are displayed with gratifying
clarity. It is suspected that this clarity might be somewhat obscured in actual practice, but, nevertheless, the article will be a handy reference item for those concerned with this problem.
Three articles deal with the subject of executive and employee compensation
and related fields: "Stock Options and Other Executive Incentive Arrangements"
by Charles W. Steadman;'
"Executive Compensation: The Taxation of Stock
Options," by Jack D. Edwards;' 9 and "Deferred Compensation Plans: Qualifying
for Non-Qualified Treatment," by James F. Neal. 20 No matter which way he likes
to have his toast buttered, the attorney should be able to find something tailormade to his particular problem in one of these three articles. It is interesting to
note that even the authors disagree as to the need for and equitable
considerations
2
influencing the use of stock option plans with tax advantages. '
As the title of the third article indicates, it deals primarily with tax considerations applicable to those deferred compensation plans not qualifying for special
15 Professor of Law, Drake University.
16 Text at 292-93.
17 Member, Legal Department, Hercules Powder Co., Wilmington, Delaware.
18 Attorney, Marshman, Hollington & Steadman, Cleveland, Ohio, and Steadman, Collier
& Shannon, Washington, D.C.
19 LL.B., Harvard Law School.
20 Associate, Turney & Turney, Washington, D.C.
21 Text at 327. "The fact remains that it is an absolute necessity for American business
to develop a pool of executive talent. This then has produced a need for effective incentive
devices to replace those which have traditionally been used. The form of such devices may
generally be described as 'deferred incentive compensation plans.'" But see text at 368:
"These general economic considerations may be stated more specifically in terms of horizontal
equity. The failure to include option profits in ordinary income is discrimination in favor
of the managing class. The income tax is intended to be a 'neutral' tax in the sense that all
people with the same amount of income shall have an equal tax liability. This principle is
violated when a segment of the taxpaying public can claim preferential treatment for part of
its earnings." And, at page 370: "A complete end to preferential treatment for option profits
is desirable. Economic considerations do not require preferential treatment. Giving them
such treatment does violence to principles of equity, and is an unnecessary drain on treasury
receipts."
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treatment under Sections 401 through 404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The do's and don'ts of proper tax planning are discussed and "caveats" are interjected in those gray areas commonly found in corporate taxation.
Twenty pages of the book are devoted to a critical survey of "New Books and
Recent Scholarship" by F. Hodge O'Neal 22 and two research associates at the Duke
University School of Law.
Certainly the authors have managed to compile handy reference material for
the attorney whose practice includes corporate problems. While the entire law of
corporations is too complex to be captured in a single book, many problems of
pressing urgency to corporate counsel have been researched and reduced to proper
size in this text.
George P. McAndrews
ATOMS AND THE LAW. By E. Blythe Stason, Samuel D. Estep, and William
J. Pierce. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959. Pp. xxvii, 1512. $15.00.
The purpose of the research project which necessarily preceded the publication of
this work was to investigate the principal legal problems being created and likely
to be created by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Interest is centered on tort liability
and workmen's compensation for radiation injuries, federal and state statutory
and administrative regulation of atomic energy, and the international aspects of
this activity.
Part I, Tort Liability and Radiation Injuries, is concerned with the legal
aspects of damage from radiation to property and persons, but only insofar as such
damage occurs as a result of peaceful uses of atomic energy. No consideration is
given to the damage caused by atomic or hydrogen bombs. This part begins with
a scientific explanation of the atomic structure and stabilization process. It notes
that new discoveries are constantly being made, and new theories evolved. The
lawyer in this field will have to keep abreast of these developments, as they may
have a decisive impact on such legal questions as negligence, causal relation and
proof of damage.
In chapter I, "Origin and Types of Radiation Injuries," the writers acknowledge that the details of neutron reactions are too complex for statement,' even if
it can be assumed that they fully understand what is now known; but they believe
that some basic knowledge is fundamental for the lawyer who is to engage in the
legal problems of atomic enterprise. The reader will become familiar with the concepts of ionization, gamma rays, alpha and beta particles, and the absorption
process. At this point Glasstone's SOURCEBOOK ON ATOMIC ENERGY 2 AND PRINCIPLES
OF NUCLEAR REACTOR ENGINEERING 3 are among the scientific materials cited and
relied upon. In the measurement of radioactivity, such terminology as radioactive
half-life, biological half-life, curie and roentgen are explained. The measurement
process is essential to the evaluation of the risks incurred and the discovery of negligence in atomic energy activities.
Chapters III and IV of Part I examine the crucial question of what general
rules of tort liability will or should be applied to these situations. Landmark cases
such as PaIsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,4 Rasmussen v. Benson" (where the court
permitted recovery for all damages claimed, even though this included the sickness
and death of a dairy farmer resulting from worry over possible harm to his customers from poisoned feed carelessly furnished by the defendant), and In re

22
1
2
3
4
5

Professor of Law, Duke University.
Text at 14.
Id. at 17; GLASSTONE, SOURCEBOOK ON ATOMIC ENERGY (1950).
Id. at 82; GLASSTONE, PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR REACTOR ENGINEERING (1955).
Id. at 90; 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
Id. at 92; 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938).
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Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co.,6 are analyzed and analogized at length. Strict
liability conceptions built on Rylands v. Fletcher7 are not omitted.
In chapter V, "Enterprise Liability in Atomic Energy," an attempt is made
to ascertain the potential liability of designers, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers
and suppliers of goods and services in the atomic energy industry. The authors
acknowledge that this is difficult s and recognize that the theories of liability in
this field are in a state of ferment. 9 As the law now stands, there is a state of
confusion between the basic concepts of tort and contract and the application of
each in any given fact situation. 0 Out of this confusion the authors draw one
conclusion: There is a marked tendency to provide compensation to persons injured by defective chattels or services by the imposition of a type of "enterprise
liability," apparently on the assumption that suppliers can shift the economic loss
through price increases and by obtaining liability insurance coverage. The importance of determining liability under existing legal doctrines is noted to be obvious,
to wit, to appraise the possibility of obtaining recoveries for persons injured by
atomic radiation and also to be able to advise entrepreneurs of sufficient insurance
coverage. In determining the existing legal doctrines the authors review the frontier
cases, Winterbottom v. Wright," Thomas v. Winchester,1 2 Huset v. J. I. Case
Threshing Machine Co.,'3 Carter v. Yardley & Co.,1 4 and MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co 5 Insofar as these cases demonstrate the necessity of giving warning, or
adequate directions for use, to purchasers of products, they are on point. 16 The
philosophy underlying the resurrection of this judge-made law implies a commitment
toward common
law rules and away from statutory rules in the atomic energy
17
enterprise.
The study predicts that, although a good deal has been learned about the
danger of atomic radiation and how to guard against injuries to persons and
property-as is clearly indicated by the almost phenomenal safety record of federal
atomic energy operations-there will be many instances of injury as the peacetime
industry develops and widespread use of radiation sources become common. This
reviewer has been unable to locate a recorded case on this question, but there can
be no doubt that a very real fear of injury exists among atomic energy planners.
Part II, Workmen's Compensation and Radiation Injuries, is primarily an
examination of selective workmen's compensation acts from the standpoint of atomic
energy and radiation injuries. The general conclusion drawn is that present statutes
are inadequate to protect employees suffering from radiation injuries; workmen's
compensation laws should be amended to accommodate radiation injuries to the
existing statutory patterns, the authors suggest. An entirely separate compensation
system is not considered necessary.'
Part III, State Regulation of Atomic Energy, presents a brief survey of the
principal types of state and interstate regulations likely to have application in the
development of an atomic energy industry, both for the generation of electric power
6 Id. at 93; 3 K.B. 560 (1921).
7 Id. at 637; 3 Hurl. and C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865); L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866);
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
8 Id. at 725.
9 Compare Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
10 Of interest on this point is GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILrTY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
(1960), reviewed in 36 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 103 (1960).
11 Text at 726; 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
12 Text at 726; 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
13 Text at 727; 120 Fed. 865 (1903).
14 Text at 728; 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
15 Text at 728; 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
16 See also McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953).
17 Text at 76.
18 Id. at 845.
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and for other industrial uses. Proposals of future legislation and suggested state
legislation, predominantly in the field of health and safety, are of importance.
Part IV, Federal Statutory and Administrative Limitations upon Atomic Activities, is written by Courts Oulahan, now on the legal staff of the Atomic Energy
Commission. This section of the study notes that the Atomic Energy Act of 19549
establishes the broadest control ever exercised by the federal government over any
one industry in the United States. This legislation was an outgrowth of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946.20 Oulahan discusses the procedures used by AEC, with particular regard to the philosophy and provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act21
and to special problems
of administrative law which have arisen under the atomic
22
energy statutes.
If Oulahan were preparing this article for publication now, no doubt he would
wish to discuss International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. United States, 23 a recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in which Oulahan participated, as
special assistant to the general counsel of AEC. The case concerned an order of
the commission which in effect continued a provisional construction permit issued
to the Power Reactor Development Co.,24 to begin work on the largest but not
the first "fast breeder" reactor in the United States. The installation was to be
on the shore of Lake Erie, 30 miles southwest of Detroit. Petitioners were national
and international labor unions and some of their members. They had intervened
in the proceedings before the commission, contending that the order would result
in the construction of a reactor which, under present technological conditions, was
inherently unsafe. The unions feared a hazard which would place their members
in danger of an explosion or other incident. Also the petitioners contended that
fear of a possible atomic catastrophe, in itself, would have the effect of depressing
values of property owned by them. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals
agreed with them; the commission's 25grant of a construction permit was set aside
because of insufficient safety findings.
The commission had found, for purposes of granting the provisional construction permit, that a utilization facility of the general type proposed can be
constructed and operated without undue risk -to the health and safety of the public.
The commission acknowledged that it had not been positively established that a
"fast breeder" reactor of the general type and power level proposed can be operated
without a possibility that significant quantities of fission products would be released in the atmosphere. The commissioners expressed confidence that future
scientific developments would enable it, in the future, to find that the reactor could
be operated without undue risk. As to these points Judge Edgerton, speaking for
the majority of the Court of Appeals, stated:
The economy cannot afford to invest enormous sums in the construction
of an atomic reactor that will not be operated. If enormous sums are in-

vested without assurance that the reactor can be operated with reasonable

safety, pressure to permit operation without adequate assurance will be great

and may be irresistible. 26
Judge Burger, dissenting, emphasized that judges are hardly in a position to de19 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1958).
20 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1801 (1958).
21 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
22 Text at 1219.
23 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
24 Id. at 646: A Michigan membership corporation organized "to study, develop, design,
fabricate, construct and operate one or more experimental nuclear power reactors . . . to the
end that there may be an early demonstration of the practical and economic use of nuclear
energy for the generation of electrical energy.

25
26

Id. at 652.
Id. at 650.

"

BOOK REVIEWS
termine whether or not our economy can afford a large investment for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. He further suggests that American history is to the contrary, and refused to assume that the members of the AEC would permit an operation dangerous to the public because $40 or $50 million are invested in a project
by men who know from the outset they are engaged in a scientific
gamble.27 This
28
case will be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
Lawyers interested in disputes such as these - and other similar questions in
the field of administrative law - will find Oulahan's work in this book an enlightening introduction.
Part V, International Control of Atomic Energy, principally concerns the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency and the role of the Soviet Union in
international cooperation for peaceful use of atomic energy.
Chapter II, by Horace W. Dewey, 29 indicates that the Soviet Union approves
the "intergovernmental regional organization open to participation by all interested
European states" 3 ° but that it bitterly assails "closed grouping of several states on
the basis of existing military blocs in Europe.13321 In the Appendix, among other
items, are some interesting excerpts from Pravda.
While the size of this book might deter the unenergetic, its pages make easy,
informative reading. One glance at the Table of Contents, 33 and the Analytical
Table of Contents,3 4 suggests the completeness with which this project was published. The kaleidoscopic nature of this book renders much of the manuscript outdated upon publication, but the project itself represents an unusual attempt by
lawyers to anticipate future problems. It is for some future reviewer to determine
whether or not they have been successful.35
William J. Gerardo

27 Id. at 654.
28 The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1960, p. 4, col. 2.
29 Assistant Professor of Russian, University of Michigan.
30 Text at 1408-09.
31 Ibid.
32 Text at 1508.
33 Text at ix.

34 Text at x-xxvi.

35 The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 1961, p. 4, col. 3, "Three Die in Blast at Atomic Test
Reactor in Idaho; No Public Danger From Radiation!:
"The explosion is likely to focus anew public attention on the safety problems
involved in locating atomic power plants near big population centers. AEG
records indicate these were the first fatalities resulting from an explosion
involving an atomic reactor."
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ADMINISTRATION OF BEVERAGE LAWS
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL. An official study by the Joint Committee of the
States to Study Alcoholic Beverage Laws.
Washington, D.C., 1960. Pp. xii, 114 (paperback).
BIOGRAPHY
HARRISON: HOOSIER WARRIOR (Through the Civil War Years,
1833-1865). By Harry J. Sievers.
New York: University Publishers, Inc., 1960. Pp. xxx; 374. $6.00. The
first in a three-volume history of Indiana's only president. The second volume
came out in late 1959.

BENJAMIN

BLUE LAWS
By Hiley H. Ward.
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960. Pp. v, 160. $3.95.

SPACE-AGE SUNDAY.

CANON LAW
(2 vols.). By John A. Abbo and Jerome D. Hannan.
St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960. Pp. 871-1; 936-11. $19.00. This twovolume work is a complete, up-to-date commentary on the Code of Canon
Law of the Roman Catholic Church. With the exception of procedural laws,
which it presents in condensed form, this work covers all the disciplinary
norms of the Church as contained in the Code and in subsequent decisions
of the Holy See.

THE SACRED CANONS

CIVIL LIBERTIES

THE PEOPLE. 40th Annual Report, American Civil Liberties Union.
Washington, D.C.: ACLU, 1960. Pp. 80. $.75 (paperback).

*BY

COPYRIGHTS AND ANTITRUST LAW
COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST. By Joseph Taubman.
New York: Federal Legal Publications, Inc., 1960. Pp. viii, 217. $8.50.
CORPORATE LAW
An Economic Analysis of Case Law. By Betty Bock.
New York: Nat'l Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1960. Pp. 143. (Paperback).
*SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE PRACTICE. Edited by Thomas
G. Roady, Jr., and William R. Andersen.
Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 423. $10.00.
MERGERS AND MARKETS:

ESTATE PLANNING
(3rd ed.). By Gilbert T. Stephenson.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960. Pp. xii, 441. $6.00.

ESTATES AND TRUSTS

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTS
THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA. By Aubert J. Clark (doctoral dissertation).
Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1960. Pp. ix,
215. $3.50 (paper bound).

INTERNATIONAL LAW
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW.

Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1960. Pp. 239.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION
BERLINER ILLUSTRIRTE.

Berlin, West Germany: Ullstein, 1961. Pp. 137-242. This is a special edition
for the United States of a Berlin magazine that has not been published by
a free press since the late 1930's. "It is our message of friendship, a renewed
Berlin pledge in the cause of liberty. This is the first edition of the BERLINER
ILLUSTRYRTE in many long years. The magazine first appeared on the streets

of Berlin in 1890, produced by the House of Ullstein. In 1935 the Nazis
seized the B.I. and made it an instrument of Hitler's brown tyranny over
Europe.. . . We Berliners know that we cannot defend Berlin with sweat
and printer's ink alone. But we are proud of our right of freedom of speech,
today above all when tyrants in this same city wish to strangle us into silence.
For this reason the re-born House of Ullstein produces this special edition,
and we send it to people who have already proved they are our friends.
This is both the story of Berlin and our way of expressing gratitude to all
in the free world who have remained true to us."
PUBLIC POLICY
CURRENT LAW

AND

SOCIAL PROBLEMS. Edited by R. St.

J. Macdonald.

Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1960. Pp. 204.
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A Study in the Legal Implementation of Social
and Economic Public Policy. Based on Wisconsin Records, 1835-1959. By
Spencer L. Kimball.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 387. $7.50 (with
full documentation); $6.00 (regular edition).
*THE SMUT PEDDLERS. By James Jackson Kilpatrick.

Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960. Pp. vi, 323. $4.50.
TAXATION
By Samuel J. Foosaner.
Mundelein, Ill.: Callaghan & Co., 1960. Pp. xiii, 380. $20.00.

TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES.
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